Home Secretary succeeds in deportation case in the Court of Appeal

The Home Office may finally succeed in its 17 year attempt to deport a man with several convictions dating back to 1992. The case is Kapikanya v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 987.

The appellant arrived in the UK in 1983 as a 14 year old child. His first conviction was in February 1992 for attempted fraud, he was later convicted of two offences of theft, and theft of a motor vehicle. On 22 May 1998 he was notified of his liability to deportation. He lost his appeal, but no deportation order was made.

The appellant was convicted of dishonesty in 2008 and again notified of his liability to deportation. On 12 March 2013 the Home Secretary made a decision to deport him. He successfully appealed and was granted leave to remain until 15 April 2016.

He was convicted of conspiracy to defraud in 2014 and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. A deportation order was made on 3 February 2016. The decision was appealed up to the Court of Appeal and then returned by consent to the First-tier Tribunal which allowed the appeal in January 2023 based on the “unduly harsh and very compelling” outcome that deportation of the appellant would create, particularly the impact on his son, who was 17 years old at the date of that appeal.

The Upper Tribunal found an error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, on the grounds that there were inadequate reasons given to support the finding of “very compelling circumstances” and that the judge misdirected himself in finding that deportation would be “unduly harsh” for the appellant’s son. The Upper Tribunal later reheard and dismissed the appeal, stating that:

I am not satisfied that such very compelling circumstances are evident in this case. The appellant committed very serious offences for which he received a significant period of imprisonment. This was not his only criminal offending. In an overall assessment, the combination of factors does not reveal the very compelling circumstances necessary. The public interest in his deportation is significant.

Permission was granted by the Court of Appeal on two grounds. First, that the Upper Tribunal was wrong to find an error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision. The second ground was that the Upper Tribunal erred when re-making the decision, including by giving inadequate reasons.

The first ground was rejected, the court noting in particular that the First-tier Tribunal judge had not considered the fact that the appellant’s child was 17.5 at the date of the hearing and lived primarily with his mother.

The second ground was also dismissed with the Court of Appeal unable to identify an error in the Upper Tribunal’s decision. The court concluded:

The Appellant has been the subject of five decisions that he should be deported over a period of a quarter of a century. The system of appeals and orders for reconsideration has served him well in enabling him to remain in the UK throughout that period. But in my view the Secretary of State should now, at last, be allowed to put the November 2016 deportation order into effect.