New commentary and report highlight persistent human rights violations against Afghans associated with the former government and international forces

Today, Asylos has published new commentary on the UK Home Office’s Country Policy and Information Note: Fear of the Taliban. The commentary focuses on the assessment of risk to former government officials and civil servants. It argues that a conclusive assessment that this profile is generally not at risk of persecution or serious harm is not supported by the country of origin information.

Published alongside the commentary is a country of origin information report focusing on the Taliban’s treatment of individuals who worked for the former government, international forces, or the judiciary under the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2004 – 2021). 

Background

A narrowed assessment of profiles considered at risk within the August 2024 Fear of the Taliban policy note signalled a troubling new approach to Afghan asylum claims, as previously discussed on Free Movement.

A year on, concern about the UK government’s handling of at risk Afghans continues to mount, following the closure of all resettlement routes, and the lifting of a super-injunction revealing a major data breach in 2022 affecting applicants to Afghan relocation schemes. A new version of the Fear of the Taliban policy note was published in August 2025, though with minimal changes to the country information and no updated country information on the profile of former government officials and civil servants.

Analysis of the Home Office’s assessment

Asylos’ commentary considers the profile of former government officials and civil servants, a profile which the UK government has deemed unlikely to be at risk since August 2024. The commentary argues that the country information within the policy note does not support such a conclusive assessment.

The commentary is a reminder that it is always worth checking the country information within the policy note itself, to understand to what extent the it is supportive of the policy note assessment. In this case, multiple sources in the policy note indicate that former government officials and civilian personnel have been subject to arbitrary arrests and detentions, human rights violations, various forms of torture and ill-treatment and extrajudicial killings.

The commentary also highlights that the UK government assessment is currently at odds with the European Union Agency for Asylum’s assessment, which appears to accept that individuals within this profile may be at risk: 

‘Acts reported to be committed against individuals under this profile [individuals affiliated with the previous government and members of the judiciary, including court personnel and civil servants] are of such severe nature that they amount to persecution (e.g. summary executions, killing, torture, enforced disappearances). [….]

‘For judges, prosecutors, and former court personnel well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated. 

‘For others under this profile, the individual assessment should take into account the institution they were employed by and their role and functions. Being female and possible personal enmities may also constitute risk-impacting circumstances. Family members may also have a well-founded fear of persecution, for example in the context of the Taliban searching for the individual they are related to.’

It also runs counter to the UNHCR’s assessment in its September 2025 guidance note on Afghanistan: 

‘…many persons of this profile [Afghans associated with the former government, security forces or allies]  —including former government officials, previous members of the ANDSF, former prosecutors or judges and persons who were affiliated with foreign forces—are likely to be in need of international protection. Other persons of this profile may be in need of international protection depending on the individual circumstances of the case…’

The commentary further argues that the strong focus on quantitative assessment of risk distorts the correct legal test for assessing whether there is a reasonable likelihood a person would be persecuted (for a Convention reason). It is argued that this has the effect of raising the evidentiary threshold for proving that people claiming to be former government officials are at risk from the Taliban. 

Finally, the commentary raises the policy note’s lack of consideration of limitations on access to information in Afghanistan. It emphasises that a lack of information on any given issue should never lead to an automatic conclusion that it is not occurring. This is particularly important in contexts like Afghanistan, where the information environment is challenging due to factors like severe restrictions on press freedom.

Why considering timely country information is so important

Despite the importance of timely country information for fair and evidence-based decision making, the August 2025 policy note does not include any updated country information on the profile of former government officials and civil servants, instead continuing to rely on country information gathered before August 2024.

Asylos’ country information report, which includes sources published between September 2024 and October 2025, may therefore be a useful resource for lawyers and decision makers.

Sources within the report reveal ongoing human rights violations against individuals against those who worked for the former government, international forces, or the judiciary under the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2004 – 2021), despite the Taliban’s declared general amnesty. Of particular note, several sources report that the 2022 data leak has led to harmful consequences, including killings of those on the leaked list, or their family members.

A Telegraph report of July 2025 quoted a Taliban official confirming that the Taliban continues to use the data leaked by the UK government to track down those on the list, and that the search had intensified in recent months.

Evidence published by Refugee Legal Support in October 2025 presents information gathered in September and October 2025 from 350 Afghans affected by the data breach. The report captures threats and risks resulting from the breach, including 49 reports of killings of family members or former colleagues, 210 reports of Taliban house searches, and more than 200 incidents of threats to family, friends or individuals on the list. 

Conclusion

By engaging with the country information set out in the government’s own policy note, and looking at how other asylum authorities have assessed risk, the commentary is a reminder that the same set of information can be interpreted in different ways. The country information report suggests that the risks still facing those who worked for the former government, international forces, or the judiciary under the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2004 – 2021) are far from insignificant.

These documents should assist lawyers working on Afghan protection claims, as well as encouraging decision makers to continue to engage with timely country information, give due consideration to limitations on access to information, and to take a cautious approach in assessing ongoing risks.