What does the immigration white paper say about workers and students?

This morning I did a quick post to let everyone know that the immigration white paper had been published, along with the summary recommendations from the paper. Let’s now take a closer look at what is being proposed for workers and students.

The paper rather unpromisingly begins with a false premise:

While much attention has rightly been focused on the surge in illegal migration across the Channel, reaching a peak of 45,744 small boat arrivals in 2022, there has been less focus on the rapid increase in the levels of legal net migration since 2019. Levels of net migration were approximately 200,000 per year throughout most of the 2010s and have risen from 224,000 in the year to June 2019 to a record high of 906,000 in the year ending June 2023- a four-fold increase in the space of under four years.

Leaving aside the assertion about focusing attention on the poor souls desperate enough to risk their lives by crossing the Channel to get here, the premise for reducing net migration is flawed from the outset. The 2019 net migration figures quoted did not include those EEA nationals and their dependants before Brexit, and so once this cohort required visas then obviously the numbers rose significantly. Nor does it take into account one off events such as Ukraine (270,000 people) and Hong Kong (177,000 people).

Work

Immigration rules incoming?

In chapter 2 of the report “Migration, Labour Market and Growth” at paragraph 45 “immediate changes to immigration rules” are trailed, but it is unclear what those might be. Paragraph 47 states that the “first stage of our reforms will mean much tighter restrictions on and reductions in lower skilled migration including changes to the Skilled Worker Visa, making support for shortage occupations temporary and linking immigration with skills and training, while also doing more to support exceptional global talent to come to the UK”. So these may be covered in the imminent rule changes.

Labour Market Evidence Group and the need for a workforce strategy

A new group, the Labour Market Evidence Group, is being created to gather data on the labour market. The group will be comprised on the Industrial Strategy Advisory Council, the Department for Work and Pensions, Skills England (and equivalent in the devolved nations) and the Migration Advisory Committee [paragraphs 59 to 62].

Sectors which are identified as having high levels of recruitment from overseas will need to provide a workforce strategy setting out what needs to be done on skills, training and other work conditions as well as how they are engaging with people already in the UK but not currently in the workforce. Employers within the sector will be expected to comply with the strategy but there are no details yet about how that will work or be enforced.

Increase to qualification level for skilled workers

The qualification threshold for the skilled worker route was lowered from RQF 6 to RQF 3 in 2020 to compensate for the loss of free movement and easy access to workers from the EU after Brexit. This change is to be reversed and a requirement for roles to be at RQF 6 as a minimum will be reinstated. The paper says that eligible occupations are expected to reduce by around 180.

Existing skilled worker visa holders in roles below RQF 6 will be able to remain in the route and renew their visa or change employment. So these changes are pretty good news for this group of people, as demand for them is likely to be quite high given the inability to bring new people in.

(Another) new shortage occupation list

Say farewell to Appendix Immigration Salary List (we barely knew her) which is to be abolished (paragraph 70). And hello to what will presumably be called Appendix Temporary Shortage List. This will provide “time limited access to the Points-Based immigration system” for roles that are below RGF 6. There will be restrictions on bringing dependants.

The current shortage list allows employers to recruit a migrant worker and pay a rate of 80% of the usual minimum salary. It looks like the new shortage list will offer only access to the skilled worker route for those roles under RQF 6, without any salary discounts.

The longer term plan for the list is that roles will only be added to the Temporary Shortage List on advice from the Migration Advisory Committee and “they are key to the industrial strategy or delivering critical infrastructure” (paragraph 77). The justification for the closure of the social care visa (paragraph 81) is that there have been “significant concerns over abuse and exploitation of individual workers”.

Last year the Work Rights Centre spoke to those who are actually working in this route and who have been affected by these issues and the main recommendation was an end to the sponsorship system. Instead the route will be closed to new applications with a transition period in place for those already in the route until 2028 (with a somewhat threatening caveat that “this will be kept under review”).

“Tied” visas and exploitation

The paper does briefly address the issue of exploitation caused by employee’s visas being “tied” to unscrupulous sponsors and indicates that they will “explore making it easier for workers to move between licensed sponsors”. It does feel like anything in this paper that could be positive is couched in far less firm language about it actually being implemented. The government has been told of the problem and the solution in clear terms by numerous oranisations, including the Migration Advisory Committee. The words “we will” appear 127 in the white paper – why not here?

They also seem to be saying that they will do something non-specific to the domestic worker visa (at paragraph 177), as though Kalayaan has not been providing evidence based recommendations for years.

Access to skilled work routes for refugees

Some of the proposals in this paper are more firm than others. This one says at paragraph 83 that “we will explore reforms” to allow a limited number of people to apply through the existing sponsored work routes where they have the necessary skills. This would presumably be similar to the Displaced Talent Mobility pilot which was launched in October 2021 and extended through to 2024.

Immigration skills charge

The immigration skills charge, paid by employers, will be increased by 32% and the money raised from the charge will be used to invest in upskilling the domestic workforce in priority sectors. Currently the charge is £364 per year for small businesses or charities and £1,000 per year for medium or large sponsors, so that will go up presumably to £480.48(ish) and £1,320 per year. Combined with a doubling in the amount of time people need to spend in the skilled worker route, from five to ten years (more on that below), this is a huge additional financial burden on employers, which let’s not forget, includes the NHS.

“Very high talent” routes

The number of places available to research interns will be increased, the paper specifically mentions targeting those working in Artificial Intelligence. Use of the Global Talent route will be simplified for scientific and design talent. The Innovator Founder visa is to be reviewed with a view to those currently studying at UK universities who wish to start a business being able to move into the route.

The expansion of the High Potential Individual route will be “explored” with a view to doubling the Global Universities List. The list excludes UK universities, so it seems that more people who attend overseas universities will be able to come to the UK while other changes in the white paper make it less attractive for students to attend university within the UK. Make it make sense.

Students

Reducing the length of the graduate visa

Onto those unattractive changes for students, the first is the reduction of the length of the graduate visa by six months, from two years to a year and a half. The reason given for this change is a flimsy “evidence suggests that between 30-70% of surveyed Graduate visa holders in employment might not have been working in RQF level 6 or above occupations”. This is despite the data also showing that 62% of those on a graduate visa are working within a month of the visa being granted, and that figure going up to 90% working within six months.

Changes for sponsors

The “pass” thresholds used to monitor student sponsor compliance will be raised by 5% (paragraph 116 to 119). This means that sponsors will need to maintain a visa refusal rate of less than 5%, a course enrolment rate of at least 95% and a course completion rate of a least 90%. A new traffic light system will mark sponsors as red, amber or green and sponsors who are close to failing will be placed on an action plan to increase compliance and they will be subject to limits on the recruitment of international students while they remain on the plan.

Sponsors using recruitment agents will need to sign up to the Agent Quality Framework. They will also need to demonstrate “that they are considering local impacts when taking its decisions on international recruitment”, which seems to specifically mean accommodation, as well as teaching facilities.

The short-term student (English language) route is also targeted, seemingly because of a 48% refusal rate in 2024. The proposal here is for a review of the recognised accreditation bodies which approve the institutions providing the English courses.

As part of the attack on student numbers, the paper is critical of students who claim asylum towards the end of their leave, with no indication that there is any understanding as to why these situations arise. If you think that you may be able to avoid entering the asylum at all, why would you not do that? Isn’t coming to the UK under a legal immigration route instead of in a small boat across the Channel what the government wants? I certainly know people who would qualify for refugee status but never needed or wanted to enter the system. But not everyone is able to avoid it forever, and yes, some people run out of options and do end up having to enter the asylum system.

A proposed levy on international student tuition fees

Another area that will be “explored” is to introduce “a levy on higher education provider income from international students, to be reinvested into the higher education and skills system”. Essentially here the government wants to get its hands on some of the international student tuition fees, as the technical annex to the white paper explains that this would be a 6% levy on those fees. More details will be revealed in the Autumn budget, presumably they will only bother if there are any universities still left by then.

English language requirements

The English language requirement will be applied to more routes than currently. A new English language requirement will be introduced for adult dependants in work and student routes. This will be introduced at basic user level (A1) but will increase for subsequent applications. The existing English language requirement level for settlement applications in most routes and for skilled workers will be increased from level B1 to B2. There is a promise in here to make it easier for people to access English language lessons, which would be welcome (paragraph 258).

Settlement

As mentioned above, the standard qualifying period for settlement for those in the points-based system routes will be doubled from five years to ten years. The additional cost for both businesses and applicants will be huge. The additional immigration health surcharge alone will be a further £5,175 per person for the five years.

There will apparently be “the opportunity to reduce the qualifying period based on Points-Based contributions to the UK economy and society”. Cynically, I expect this to be some sort of exemption for the rich, but we shall see, the proposals for this very unattractively named “Earned Settlement” will be consulted on later this year. There are similar proposals for citizenship.

Conclusion

Is all of this really easier than trying to tackle false narratives about immigration in the right wing press?