Disabled man in unsuccessful challenge to asylum accommodation

A deaf and blind man has unsuccessfully challenged the Home Office’s decision to move him within the asylum accommodation system, away from a place where he could easily access a supportive community. The case is R (BLV) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWHC 2516 (Admin) and is also a reminder of the issues with attempting a “rolling review” of decisions in a judicial review.

Background

The claimant is an Iranian national who has been deaf since birth, is legally blind, has major depressive disorder and generalised anxiety disorder. His main method of communication is Farsi Sign Language, he can also read and write basic Farsi and has a limited understanding of British Sign Language.

BLV claimed asylum in May 2022 and an appeal against the refusal is currently ongoing. He is being provided with asylum accommodation and financial support under section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.

Before April 2023, the claimant was accommodated in Dulwich and Cricklewood, where he was able to develop some social connections including to an Iranian church in Finchley whose attendees include people who can communicate in Farsi Sign Language. He had also become familiar with the area in Cricklewood, meaning that he was able to get the bus by himself to the Iranian church and to a British Sign Language course in Holborn.

In April 2023 BLV was moved to a flat in Enfield which was a barrier to his being able to travel independently and maintain social connections. He asked to be moved to somewhere where he would still be able to access the Iranian church by bus.

The claimant said that internet access was also difficult, with no wifi and poor mobile coverage which prevented him from accessing deaf-specialist remote mental health support provided using sign language communication via video calling.

The judicial review

The claimant sought judicial review of two decisions by the Home Secretary. The first was a refusal to provide wifi. The second request was for relocation as well as additional support. Following commencement of the claim and after the Home Secretary had served her detailed grounds of defence, the government legal department sent a letter stating:

“My client, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, gives the Claimant notice that the above-mentioned decisions are withdrawn and that further, that she will proceed to make a new decision on the Claimant’s entitlement to additional support payments and accommodation within 21 days of the date of this letter … (absent special circumstances). To assist her in making a new decision, the Secretary of State for the Home Department requests the following evidence not later than 7 days after the date of this letter: … [LIST OF REQUESTED ITEMS SET OUT].”

The parties then agreed a draft consent order which provided for the judicial review to continue as a challenge to the new decision (presumably only if this was another refusal). The new decision was made on 4 July 2025 and the substantive hearing was listed for 24 July 2025.

On 17 July 2025 a witness statement was filed by the defendant which amounted to 275 pages including exhibits. There were a variety of procedural issues and the court said that this case illustrates why “in general, fresh decisions should be challenged by fresh claims…” (Al-Haq v Secretary of State for Business and Trade [2025] EWHC 173 (Admin)) rather than a “rolling review”.

The court said that the Home Secretary’s approach in the letter of 11 June was “inappropriate” and that the process should have been as follows:

The Defendant should have recognised that her withdrawal of the challenged decisions, and her intended reconsideration, had rendered the existing proceedings academic and made it appropriate for those proceedings to be ended. She should have explained her reasons for wishing to take a new decision and proposed terms – in particular, as to costs – on which the existing proceedings be concluded by consent. If her reasons genuinely related to a need to take account of either (i) a material change in circumstances that had arisen, or (ii) new information that had been provided to her, only after the dates of the challenged decisions, then the appropriate costs order would probably have been ‘no order for costs’. If, however, the Defendant’s reasons were, in truth, that she recognised that her existing decisions were unlikely to withstand challenge, and she wished to take a replacement decision that she would have a better chance of successfully defending, then she should have offered to pay the Claimant’s costs. If the parties were unable to reach agreement as to the appropriate costs order, then they could, as a last resort, have agreed a draft consent order providing that the claim be withdrawn and setting out a procedural timetable for the Court to resolve the costs issue based on short written submissions.

Despite the procedural concerns raised, the court took the pragmatic course of proceeding to decide the claim and granted permission to the claimant to amend his grounds to challenge the new decision.

The court found that the claimant’s evidence regarding his situation was not entirely reliable, attributing this to the difficulty in communicating with the claimant, combined with the “very negative perception” he held of his accommodation, likely related to his diagnosed disorders.

Addressing the challenge relating to the adequacy of his accommodation, the court said that the Home Secretary had already made “significant concessions” from the general approach to accommodation for single asylum seekers, through the provision of self-contained accommodation in London. It was also noted that the claimant is able to have friends visit him and he also spends 10 hours a week with deaf support workers provided by the council.

The court noted an important distinction between the different forms of statutory support:

This case serves to highlight the radical difference between (i) the objective of, and requirements imposed on the Defendant by, ss.95-96 IAA 1999, and (ii) the objective of, and requirements imposed on local authorities by, the Care Act. The IAA 1999 is directed at ensuring the provision for asylum seekers of a minimum level of support so as to rescue them from destitution, i.e. from conditions of life so poor that their basic needs would be unmet. This implies a duty for the Defendant to meet essential needs but no more. Such a duty is fundamentally different in objective and character from the duty of local authorities under s.1 of the Care Act “to promote [an] individual’s well-being“, including in relation to “control by the individual over day-to-day life“, “participation in work, education, training or recreation“, “social and economic well-being“, and “the individual’s contribution to society“, and doing so having regard to “the individual’s views, wishes, feelings and beliefs“. A duty to meet basic human needs is not to be equated with a duty to promote human flourishing or to ensure that a person who has disabilities can live as full and as independent a life as possible.

All of the grounds relating to the accommodation decision were dismissed.

On the wifi challenge, the court made some useful findings about the need for internet access:

The situation in this country today is that internet-based communication is a part of everyday life, and that access to such communication has become essential for interacting with other people and accessing public services. Public services for deaf people in particular are provided in ways that effectively assume access to video calling technology.

The claimant’s evidence about his current mobile internet access being insufficient was accepted, however the court said that he may be able to get the level of internet access he needed through a different mobile network. There was no evidence as to whether the claimant had investigated other options.

This lack of evidence had also been raised by the Home Secretary in the new decision. The court noted that the decision had not refused to provide any additional support to the claimant, but had instead asked for more evidence to be provided so that this could be properly considered and funds “provided to cover any shortfall between your weekly communication payments and the cost for a reasonable mobile data package”. The challenge to the refusal to provide wifi was also dismissed.

Conclusion

This is the reality of asylum accommodation. It is people settling into a home and trying to build a life and a community, before they are arbitrarily moved away from it all without any notice. For those with disabilities, life is even more difficult.