In MC (Essa principles recast) Portugal [2015] UKUT 520 (IAC), Dr Storey, with the assistance of new Upper Tribunal Judge Canavan, turns his attention to the pressing issue of reinterpreting the principles in the cases of Essa, of which there are three, as already reinterpreted by the Court of Appeal in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Dumliauskas [2015] EWCA Civ 145.

In the headnote, which at ten paragraphs long is fully 25% of the length of the actual determination (which almost reads as an afterthought) we are instructed thus:

1. Essa rehabilitation principles are specific to decisions taken on public policy, public security and public health grounds under regulation 21 of the 2006 EEA Regulations.

2. It is only if the personal conduct of the person concerned is found to represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society (regulation 21(5)(c)) that it becomes relevant to consider whether the decision is proportionate taking into account all the considerations identified in regulation 21(5)-(6).

3. There is no specific reference in the expulsion provisions of either Directive 2004/38/EC or the 2006 EEA Regulations to rehabilitation, but it has been seen by the Court of Justice as an aspect of integration, which is one of the factors referred to in Article 28(1) and regulation 21(6) ( Essa (2013) at [23]).

4. Rehabilitation is not an issue to be addressed in every EEA deportation or removal decision taken under regulation 21; it will not be relevant, for example, if rehabilitation has already been completed ( Essa (2013) at [32]-[33]).

5. Reference to prospects of rehabilitation concerns reasonable prospects of a person ceasing to commit crime ( Essa (2013) at [35]), not the mere possibility of rehabilitation. Mere capability of rehabilitation is not to be equated with reasonable prospect of rehabilitation.

6. Where relevant (see (4) above) such prospects are a factor to be taken into account in the proportionality assessment required by regulation 21(5) and (6) (( Dumliauskas [41]).

7. Such prospects are to be taken into account even if not raised by the offender ( Dumliauskas [52]).

8. Gauging such prospects requires assessing the relative prospects of rehabilitation in the host Member State as compared with those in the Member State of origin, but, in the absence of evidence, it is not to be assumed that prospects are materially different in that other Member State ( Dumliauskas [46], [52]-[53] and [59]).

9. Matters that are relevant when examining the prospects of the rehabilitation of offenders include family ties and responsibilities, accommodation, education, training, employment, active membership of a community and the like ( Essa (2013) at [34]). However, lack of access to a Probation Officer or equivalent in the other Member State should not, in general, preclude deportation ( Dumliauskas [55])

10. In the absence of integration and a right of permanent residence, the future prospects of integration cannot be a weighty factor ( Dumliauskas [44] and [54]). Even when such prospects have significant weight they are not a trump card, as what the Directive and the 2006 EEA Regulations require is a wide-ranging holistic assessment. Both recognise that the more serious the risk of reoffending, and the offences that a person may commit, the greater the right to interfere with the right of residence ( Dumliauskas at [46] and [54]).

The Court of Appeal tells us that rehabilitation is capable of being an “important factor” in non EU law cases: Danso v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 596. It is hard, therefore, to see why it is not also capable of being considered important in EU law, as the tribunal here in MC concludes.

The appellant loses, of course.